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Strategy: “On War“ Carl Von Clausewitz part 2

/ 52:30/E45
Carl Von Clausewitz Part 2


Different cultures have different ways of committing violent acts. As a young boy you learn to understand that some times you got to fight to be a man!

Transcript:
https://app.podscribe.ai/episode/49720293

Speaker 0 (0s): What up everybody? Well, welcome back. I hope you enjoyed Von Clausewitz part one. Did you catch that whistle in the beginning? Let me do it again. You guys know what that means. That means run white boy run. Cause you're about to get your ass kicked. That's what that means. I know because I was the white guy running. 

And since we're talking about war, I thought I'd start off this particular episode with a story about me getting my ass kicked. I don't know if that's magic or tragic, but here you go. So I'm a short white guy, talks a lot of shit should be no surprise to anybody. I gotten beat up a lot when I was a young man, I used to spend a lot of time at my cousin's house. And he lived in a predominantly Mexican neighborhood, which is cool with me. 

Cause I like Mexican food and I like Mexican people. And I think Mexican women are beautiful. And I was cool with all my neighbors and everybody around my cousin's house. But sometimes I had to walk a couple miles to go to the store. And so when I would do that, I had to walk through like a really rough part of town. 

And I think everybody knows if you're the wrong color in the wrong part of town, you're probably going to catch a right hook to the face. And that's what happened to me as I was coming back from the store, see, I successfully navigated the treacherous pathway to the store, but on my way back, I noticed some people noticing me. 

And then I heard this sound. And then all of a sudden the guy that was making that sound, I was staring at him whistling. And then I noticed some people coming from the other side, it was an ambush. It was an ambush. It's interesting because it's kind of ties into language. And I know this isn't a language podcast. We're going to get the Von Clausewitz. We're going to get there. But I think that this part is imperative. 

You know, the whistling language that is often found in South America is thought to be a primitive language. And in some time, in some particular schools of linguistics, it's thought to be extinct, but you need not go further than Vista California to find out that that language is alive and well, it may not have the exact same meanings, but as I was taking a few to the dome and these guys were whistling, I thought to myself, wow, that's a pretty good form of language. 

I mean, no one really knows what you're saying. Except the people whistling. There's all these codes. You know what I, you know, what's funny too. One more, little quick story here. You got to love the Mexican people. Every time I got beat up by a Mexican guy, he always had the common courtesy to make up a story. You know what I mean? By that, like when these guys came down, like after they did their, like one guy came up to me and he's like, Hey man, why you jumped my friend essay? 

Why did you jump my friend homes? You know? And I looking back on it, I think it goes, I think it goes to the heart of a good family. At least that young thug had the common decency to pretend like I had offended him. He didn't just come over and punch me in the face without saying something. You see what I mean? He at least had the decency to pretend that at some point in time I jumped one of his friends, even though I didn't never seen the men in my life, it's almost like he had a conscious and he was like, man, I can't just punch this guy. 

I have to at least pretend like something bad happened. You got to admire that. I think a that goes out to the heart and soul of them. My, my Mexican brothers. I love you guys. Thanks for teaching me some lessons. Okay. So we are on Von Clausewitz and we're going to, we're going to go down a few more points here of what war is. We went through 11 points in the previous podcast, and now we're going to go through some more. 

We left off with the last point we left off with was the political object. Now comes to the fore again. And let me just bring you guys up to speed by finishing the last paragraph so that you don't feel like you were unable to dip your toe in the water. Before we jumped in, generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will. 

If the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion, this will be all the more so as the political object increases its predominance. Thus, it follows that without any inconsistency Wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. This brings us to a different question, which now needs to be analyzed and answered. 

Is there anyone out there that thinks they know the answer to that question? I'm listening. Put it in the comments below. Here we go. This is the point. Number 12, an interruption of military activity is not explained by anything yet said. However, modest, the political demands may be on either side, however, small, the means employed, however limited the military objective can the process of war ever be interrupted. 

Even for a moment. The question reaches deep into the heart of the matter. Every action needs a certain time to be completed. That period is called its duration and its length will depend on the speed with which the person acting works. We need not concern ourselves with the difference here. Everyone performs a task in his own way, a slow man, however does not do it more slowly because he wants to spend more time over it. 

But because his nature causes hand to need more time. If he made more haste, he would do the job less. Well. His speed then is determined by subjective causes and as a factor in the actual duration of the task, I'll stop there for a moment and just give some commentary. Are you guys noticing how this can be applied? Not only to war, but how these strategies can be applied to your daily life? 

You know, knowing that everyone performs a task in their own way and knowing the example of a slow man does not do it more slowly because he wants to spend more time over it. But because his nature causes him to need more time. You see all throughout these points, you can apply these strategies to your daily life. And I think it ties in really well with the neural linguistic programming courses that we are also doing in the podcast that you can find. 

If you go to true life podcast, one word capital T R U E capital L I F E true life. One word, search it. Now if every action and war is allowed its appropriate duration, we would agree that at least at first sight, any additional expenditure of time, any suspension of military action seems absurd in this connection. 

It must be remembered that what we are talking about is not the progress made by one side or the other, but the progress of military interaction as a whole, it's an important distinction there. Next point 13 only one consideration can suspend military action. And it seems that it can never be present on more than one side. 

If two parties have prepared for war, some motive of hostility must have brought them to that point. Moreover so long as they remain under arms, that means not negotiating a settlement that motive of hostility must still be active. Only one consideration can restrain it a desire to wait for a better moment before acting. 

Speaker 1 (10m 31s): We should attack dumb ass. 

Speaker 0 (10m 42s): That's a fucking dumb idea. They're shooting at us. 

Speaker 1 (10m 47s): We should wait for a better book. Let's go through that again. 

Speaker 0 (10m 54s): If two parties have prepared for war, some motive of hostility must have brought them to that point. Moreover so long as they remain under arms, that motive of hostility must still be active. Only one consideration can restrain it a desire to wait for a better moment before acting. Got it good at first sight at first sight, one would think this desire could never operate on more than one side since it's opposite, must automatically be working on the other. 

If action would bring an advantage to one side, the other's interest must be to wait, but an absolute balance of forces can not bring about a standstill for if such a balance should exist. The initiative would necessarily belong to the side with the positive purpose. AKA the attacker one could however, conceive of a state of balance in which the side with the positive aim, the side with the stronger grounds for action was the one that had the weaker forces. 

The balance would then result from the combined effects of aim and strength were that the case one would have to say that unless some shift in the balance were in prospect, the two sides should make peace. If however, some alteration were to be foreseen, only one side could expect to gain by it. A fact which Ahed to stimulate the other into action inaction clearly cannot be explained by the concept of balance. 

The only explanation is that both are waiting for a better time to act. Let us suppose therefore that one of the two States has a positive aim, say the conquest of a part of the other's territory to use for bargaining at the peace table. Once the prize is in his hands, the political object has been achieved. There is no need to do more and it can let matters rest. If the other state is ready to accept the situation, it should Sue for peace. 

If not, it must do something. And if it thinks it will be better organized for action in four weeks time, it clearly has an adequate reason for not taking action at once. But from that moment on logic would seem to call for action. By the other side, the object being to deny the enemy the time he needs for getting ready throughout all this. I have assumed of course, that both sides understand the situation perfectly. 

You see, that's why truth is always the first casualty of war. Even if you tell your own citizens, then you are leaking potential harmful, detrimental information to the enemy. Number 14 continuity would thus be brought about in military action and would again, intensify everything. If this continuity were really to exist in the campaign, its effect would again be to drive everything to extremes, not only with such ceaseless activity, arouse men's feelings and inject them with more passion and elemental strength, but events would follow more closely on each other and be governed a stricter causal chain. 

Each individual action would be more important and consequently more dangerous, but war of course, seldom if ever shows such continuity in numerous conflicts, only a very small part of the time is occupied by action. While the rest is spent in inactivity, this cannot always be an anomaly suspension of action in war must be possible. 

In other words, it is not a contradiction in terms. Let me demonstrate this point and explain the reasons for it. Number 15 here, a principle of polarity is proposed by thinking that the interests of the two commanders are opposed in equal measure to each other. We have assumed a genuine polarity. 

A whole chapter will be devoted to the subject further on, but the following must be said about it here. Principle of polarity is valid only in relation to one and the same object in which positive and negative interests exactly cancel one another out in a battle. Each side aims at victory. That is a case of true polarity. 

Since the victory of one side excludes the victory of the other win. However, we are dealing with two different things that have a common relation external to themselves, the polarity lies, not in the things, but in the relationship you get that part. I think it's worth repeating. The principle of polarity is valid only in relation to one and the same object in which positive and negative interest exactly cancel one another out in a battle. 

Each side aims at victory. That is a case of true polarity. Since the victory of one side exclude the victory of the other win. However, we are dealing with two different things that have a common relation external to themselves, the polarity lies, not in the things, but in their relationship. That particular point is of incredible importance in today's environment, especially with the end of the nation States, especially with world's most powerful military sort of being a private military for multinational corporation. 

You no longer have 

Speaker 1 (17m 54s): A true polarity. You do have a polarity that lies 

Speaker 0 (18m 3s): In the relationship. Both sides are not aiming at victory because it's not the United States versus Iraq. It's not the United States versus Iran. There's no true polarity there. And for the record for all my friends and in Europe, for all my friends in the Eastern block and for all my friends all around the world, let me be clear. The majority of the American people are doing everything we can to get out of your country. 

Speaker 1 (18m 41s): No, 

Speaker 0 (18m 44s): The American people don't truly benefit by having our sons and daughters 

Speaker 1 (18m 55s): Becoming cannon fodder for the interests of large corporations, right? The American people 

Speaker 0 (19m 9s): Are much like the people in your country in that our government has lied to us. 

Speaker 1 (19m 20s): Wait, I think, 

Speaker 0 (19m 22s): Let me put it this way. If I invaded the international house of pancakes, pancakes would be free in my house. Americans are not getting free pancakes. You get it. I just wanted to send that out. I love all, I love all you guys, whether you're in Spain or Italy or Albania or Malta or Ukraine, I'm with you reach out to me. 

If you guys want to talk, reach out to me, let's, let's move on to the next point here. 16 attack in defense being things different in kind and unequal in strength. Polarity cannot be applied to them. 

If war assumed only a single form, namely attacking the enemy and defense were nonexistent, or to put it in another way, if the only differences between attack and defense lay in the fact that attack has a positive aim, whereas defense has not. And the forms of fighting were identical. Then every advantage gained by one side would be a precisely equal disadvantage to the other true polarity would exist, but there are two distinct forms of action in war attack and defense as will be shown in detail later, the two are very different and unequal in strength. 

Polarity then does not lie in attack or defense, but in the object both seek to achieve the decision. If one commander wants to postpone the decision, the other most want to haste in it always assuming that both are engaged in the same kind of fighting if it is in A's interest, not to attack B now, but to attack him in four weeks, then it is in B's interest not to be attacked in four weeks time, but now this is an immediate and direct conflict of interest, but it does not follow from this that it would also be to B's advantage to make an immediate attack on a, that would obviously be quite another matter. 

17, the superiority of defense over attack often destroys the effect of polarity. And this explains the suspension of military action. As we shall see, defense is a stronger form of fighting van attack. Consequently, we must ask whether the advantage of postponing a decision is as great for one side as the advantage of defense is for the other. 

Whenever it is not, it cannot balance the advantage of defense and in this way influenced the progress of the war. It is clear then that the impulse created by the polarity of interest may be exhausted in the difference between the strength of attack and defense and may thus become inoperative. Consequently, if the side favored by present conditions is not sufficiently strong to do without the added advantage of the defense. 

It will have to accept the prospect of acting under unfavorable conditions in the future to fight a defensive battle. Under these less favorable conditions may still be better than to attack immediately or to make peace. I am convinced that the superiority of the defensive, if rightly understood, is very great, far greater than appears at first sight. 

It is this which explains without any inconsistency, most periods of inaction, that a core in war, the weaker, the motives for action, the more will they be overlayed and neutralized by the disparity between attack and defense. And the more frequently will action be suspended as indeed. Experience shows 18 a second cause is imperfect knowledge of the situation. 

There is still another factor that can bring military action to a stand still imperfect knowledge of the situation. The only situation a commander can know fully is his own his opponents. He can know only from unreliable intelligence, his evaluation therefore may be mistaken and can lead him to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy. When in fact it remains with him, of course, such faulty appreciation is a likely to lead to ill tempered action as to ill timed inaction, and is no more conducive to slowing down operations than it is to speeding them up. 

Nevertheless, it must rank among the natural causes, which without entailing inconsistency can bring military activity to a halt. Men are always more inclined to pitch their estimate of the enemy strength to high than too low, such as human nature. Important point, bearing this in mind. One must admit that partial ignorance of the situation is generally speaking, a major factor in delaying the progress of military action and in moderating the principle that underlies it, the possibility of an action has a further moderating effect on the progress of the war by diluting it. 

So to speak in time by delaying danger and by increasing the means of restoring a balance between the two sides, the greater the tensions that have led to war and the greater the consequent war effort, the shorter, these periods of an action inversely, the weaker, the motive for conflict, the longer the intervals between actions for the stronger motive increases willpower and willpower. As we know, it is always both an element in and the product 

Speaker 2 (26m 26s): Of strength. Okay. 

Speaker 0 (26m 28s): 19 frequent periods of inaction, remove war still further from the realm of the absolute and make it even more, a matter of assessing probabilities, the slower, the progress, and the more frequent the interruptions of military action, the easier it is to retrieve a mistake. The Boulder will be the General's assessment and the more likely he will be to avoid theoretical extremes and to base his plans on probability and inference. 

Any given situation requires that probabilities be calculated in the light of circumstances. And the amount of time available for such calculation will depend on the pace with which operations are taking place. Number 20, therefore only the element of chance is needed to make war a gamble. And that element is never absent. 

It is now quite clear how greatly the objective nature of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble chance. The very last thing that war lacks, no other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And though the element of chance guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war and through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war from 21, not only it's objective, but also it's subjective nature makes war a gamble. 

If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war, the means by which war has to be fought, it will look more than ever like a gamble. The element in which war exists is danger. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage. Now courage is perfectly compatible with prudent calculation, but the two differ nonetheless and pertain to different psychological forces daring. 

On the other hand, boldness rashness trusting and luck are only variants of courage and all these traits of characters seek their proper element chance in short, absolute so-called mathematical factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start, there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry and the whole range of human activities. 

War most closely resembles a game of cards, 22, how in general, this best suit human nature, although we're intellect always longs for clarity and certainty. Our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating. It prefers to daydream and the realms of chance and luck rather than accompanying the intellect on it's narrow and torture his path, a philosophical inquiry and logical deduction only to arrive hardly knowing how in unfamiliar surroundings where all the usual landmark seem to have disappeared. 

Unconfined by narrow necessity. It can revel in a wealth of possibilities, which inspire courage to take wing and dive into the element of daring and danger, like a fearless swimmer into the current should theory, leave us here and cheerfully go one elaborating absolute conclusions and prescriptions. Then it would be no use at all in real life. No, it must also take the human factor into account and find room for courage. 

Boldness even foolhardiness the art of war deals with living and with moral forces, consequently, it cannot attain the absolute or certainty. It must always leave a margin for uncertainty in the greatest things, as much as in the smallest with uncertainty in one scale courage, and self-confidence must be thrown into the other to correct the balance, the greater they are, the greater, the margin that can be left for accidents. 

Thus courage and self-confidence are essential in war and theater should propose only rules that give ample scope to these finest and least dispensable of military virtues in all their degrees and variations. Even in daring, there can't be method and caution, but here they are measured by a different standard number 23, but war is nonetheless a serious means to a serious end, a more precise definition of war. 

Are you ready for this? Let's get a more precise definition. Such is war such as the commander who directs it and such the theory that governs it. War is no pastime. It is no mere joy and daring and winning no place for irresponsible enthusiastic. It is a serious means to a serious end and all its colorful resemblance to a game of chance. All the vicissitudes of passion, courage, imagination, and enthusiasm. 

It includes are merely its special characteristics. When whole communities go to war whole peoples and especially civilized peoples, the reason always lies in some political situation. And the occasion is always due to some political object war. Therefore is an act of policy we're at a complete untrammeled, absolute manifestation of violence. 

As the pure concept would require war would have its own independent. Will you serve the place of policy? The moment policy you had brought it into being it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature. Very much like a mind that can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting. This in fact is the view that has been taken of the matter. Whenever some discord between policy and the conduct of war has stimulated theoretical distinctions of this kind, but in reality, things are different. 

And this view is thoroughly mistaken. In reality war as has been shown is not like that it's violence is not of the kind that explodes in a single discharge, but is the effect of forces that do not always develop in exactly the same manner or to the same degree. At times they will expand sufficiently to overcome the resistance of inertia or friction at others. They are too weak to have any effect. 

War is a pulsation of violence, variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy war moves on its goal with varying speeds, but it always lasts long enough for influence to be exerted on the goal and for its own course to be changed in one way or another long enough. 

In other words, to remain subject to the action of a superior intelligence. If we keep in mind that war Springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the Supreme consideration in conducting it that however does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means a process which can radically change it yet. 

The political aim remains the first consideration policy then will permeate all military operations. And in so far as their violent nature will admit it we'll have it continuous influence upon them. 24 war is merely the continuation of policy by other means. We see therefore that war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means what remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means war in general and the commander and any specific instance is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policies shall not be inconsistent with these means that of course is no small demand, but however much it may affect political aims. 

In a given case, it will never do more than modify them however much. It may affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them however much it may affect political aims in any given case, it will never do more than modify them. 

Speaker 1 (37m 13s): The political 

Speaker 0 (37m 14s): Cool object is the goal. War is the means of reaching it and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose 25, the diverse nature of war, the more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fierce or the tensions that precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach it's abstract concept. 

The more important will be the destruction of the enemy. The more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less with a militaries elements, natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course. 

The political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character at this point to prevent the reader from going or stray. It must be observed that the phrase, the natural tendency of war is used in its philosophical strictly logical sense alone, and does not refer to the tendencies of the forces that are actually engaged in fighting, including for instance, the morale and emotions of the combatants at times, it is true. 

These might be so aroused at the political factor would be hard put to control them yet. Such a conflict will not occur very often for if the motivations are so powerful, there must be a policy of proportionate magnitude. On the other hand, if policy is directed only toward minor objectives, the emotions of the masses will be little stirred and they will have to be stimulated rather than held back 26. 

All Wars can be considered acts of policy. It is time to return to the main theme and observed what, why it is time to return to the main theme and observe that while policy is apparently a faced in the one kind of war and yet is strongly evident in the other, both kinds are equally political. 

If the state is thought of as a person and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared as a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence, only if politics is regarded not as resulting from a just appreciation of affairs, but as it conventionally is as cautious devious, even dishonest shying away from force could the second type of war appear to be 

Speaker 1 (40m 49s): B 

Speaker 0 (40m 51s): More political than the first 27, the effects of this point of view on the understanding of military history and the foundations of theory first, therefore it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous, but always as an instrument of policy. Otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently second, this way of looking at it will show us how Wars most vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. 

The first, the Supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesmen and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking. Neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive it will be given detailed study later in the chapter on war plans. 

It is enough for the moment to have reached this stage and to have established the Cardinal point of view from which war and the theory of war have to be examined 28. The consequences for theory, war is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case as a total phenomenon, it's dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical Trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred, and in muddy, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam and of its element of subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. 

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people. The second, the commander and his army, the third, the government, the passions that are to be kindled and war must already be inherent in the people, the scope, which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and his army. But the political aims are the business of government alone. 

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep rooted in their subject, and yet variable in their relationship to one another, a theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality, to such an extent that for this reason alone, it would be totally useless. Our task that for is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets. 

What lines might best be followed to achieve this difficult task will be explored in the book on the theory of war book too, at any rate, the preliminary concept of war, which we have formulated CAS a first Ray of light on the basic structures of theory and enables us to make an initial differentiation and identification of its major components. 

Well, well, well, what do people think so far? What do you guys think so far? I, for 1:00 AM kind of blown away. There's so much in there. There's so much that you can use to apply in your daily relationships. There's so much in there that you can apply to what's happening in your daily environment. 

There's so much in there that can help you understand and possibly predict what is about to happen in the very near future. I know that in this country, from my friends in Europe or my friends around the world, I believe that you are going to see, or let me put that differently. 

I believe you are not going to see an election this year. I believe that neither side will accept the results and that the chaos, the insecurity, the uncertainty will be catastrophic for supply chains for business, for wellbeing. 

I believe that this plan has been in place for a while. The fact that our presidents are not going to have a debate. The fact that one of our presidents is clearly tied to Jeffrey Epstein. The fact that one of our presidents is clearly, or at least doing a really good job of pretending to be seen. I think it speaks volumes. If you are in Europe, you are in the middle East, you are in South America. 

I hope that you are prepared because I think shit is about to hit the fan. I love you guys. We are going to continue to go over one Clausewitz. We're going to move on to Hannibal that this, and we're going to get into how to fight Wars in a strategic manner. We're going to get into battlefields battle plans and strategies, the underdog, overwhelming forces subversion. 

I want to be the guy that provides you listening to this with the ability to out-think your enemy. And I don't care who your enemy is. I want you to win. I want you to think clearly I want you to take the examples that were given to us by our fathers and our grandfathers of all colors of all races and understand that you are a warrior and that if you must fight to make this world a better place than you do. 

So I love you Aloha. 

Strategy: “On War“ Carl Von Clausewitz part 2

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